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FOREWORD
HON. ROY K. ALTMAN *
The federal judiciary is no stranger to crisis. Throughout American history, we’ve repeatedly asked our federal courts—in times of
war and national emergency—to find, and sometimes to draw, the
evanescent line that marks the outer limits of governmental power.
From the Whiskey Rebellion to the Civil War, from World War II
to the COVID-19 pandemic, federal judges have had to reconcile the
powerful—and sometimes competing—demands of safety and freedom. Some of the Supreme Court’s most well-known decisions, in
fact, were forged in just this kind of crisis. 1
And there’s a tendency to think of the judge’s role in these emergencies as being purely decisional. Which is to say that we like to
conceive of the judiciary as being mostly reactive—inoffensive
even. In this standard historical reconstruction, the executive official—faced with exigency—sets the litigative process in motion by
acting boldly (and perhaps extra-constitutionally). In response, the
court reviews the parties’ submissions, coldly interprets the law and
the facts, and renders its judgment—always at a distance, detached
from (and unaffected by) the emergency itself. 2 And it’s this
United States District Judge for the Southern District of Florida. I want to
thank Mark Pinkert and Brandon Sadowsky for their help with this Foreword.
1
See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862); Home Building
& Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S.
1 (1942); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723
(2008).
2
See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1029–30 (2003) (“The executive
branch assumes a leading role in countering the crisis, with the other two branches
pushed aside (whether of their own volition or not).”). Indeed, scholars sometimes
criticize courts for being too deferential in these emergencies. See, e.g.,
CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, IN THE NAME OF WAR: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE WAR
POWERS SINCE 1918 261–64, 268 (1989) (describing courts as giving “[r]itualistic
*
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dispassionate judgment—often in the form of a written opinion—
that later generations are left to digest, discuss, and debate.
We owe much of this perception to Alexander Hamilton’s oftcited description of judges as having “neither FORCE nor WILL,
but merely judgment.” 3 For the most part—and in normal circumstances—Hamilton was right: The Constitution does invest federal
judges with jurisdiction only over “Cases” and “Controversies,” 4
and we judges do “zealously” guard the boundaries of our narrowlycircumscribed jurisdiction. 5 Hamilton was also right that the core
function of federal judges is to sit in judgment—guarding our constitutional rights—as the elected branches address the more-immediate challenges of the day.
But, in moments of crisis, this well-accepted view of The Least
Dangerous Branch 6 is partially incomplete precisely because it tends
to undervalue the many ways in which judges, as human beings, and
courthouses, as tangible structures, are physically affected by the
events around them. The standard narrative thus leads us to overlook
how, and to what extent, the court’s operations might also be disrupted by national emergencies—disruptions that, in and of themselves, then push up against (perhaps even impinge upon) our rights
and liberties. The point is that the judiciary isn’t a two-dimensional
organization—a collection of law-breathing automatons whose
work product exists only on paper. It, to the contrary, functions very
much in the real world—and its decisions are often a product of realworld exigencies. We should always remember, in short, that courts
aren’t simply reactive institutions—responding to whatever actions
the other branches might take. They, instead, must often interpose
themselves between the People and their government on the one
hand, while they govern (and simultaneously constrain) on the other.
[a]pproval” to governmental emergency measures and suggesting that courts
“steer a middle course and defer review until the emergency has abated”).
3
FEDERALIST No. 78.
4
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
5
Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[B]ecause a
federal court is powerless to act beyond its statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction, a court must zealously insure that jurisdiction exists over a case, and
should itself raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction at any point in the
litigation where a doubt about jurisdiction arises.”).
6
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).

2022]

FOREWORD

931

With due respect to Colonel Hamilton, in other words, judging often
requires strength and will—not merely judgment.
This has been true since the Founding—when the judiciary was
in its infancy. The First Judiciary Act of 1789, 7 in fact, required Supreme Court justices to “ride circuit”—literally, to travel around the
country (by horse or on foot) to preside over and to resolve sometimes-minor disputes. Modeled after the old English practice, this
process of riding circuit was physically taxing, particularly at a time
when travel was slow and precarious. 8 In 1799, Justice James Iredell—worn down by his circuit duties—died at just forty-eight years
old. 9 Other early justices, including our first Chief Justice, John Jay,
resigned (in part) because of the job’s physical burdens—and some
candidates even turned down appointments for similar reasons. 10
The grueling, physical aspect of the job thus shaped the nascent Supreme Court and, as we’re about to see, played a key role in the
outcome of some early crises.
Take, for instance, the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794. President
Washington—most of us know—suppressed the violent tax protests
that had broken out in rural Pennsylvania that year by leading 13,000
militiamen (many of them veterans of the Revolution) directly into
the mob, disbanding it, and rounding up its leaders. But few of us
remember that Washington didn’t act under his Article II powers
alone. He also invoked the Militia Act of 1792, which required, as a
precondition to the use of force, a federal judge to certify that the
rebellion actually constituted an emergency. 11 Seeking just such a
certification, Washington petitioned the Supreme Court, and the
case landed on the desk of Justice James Wilson, whose circuit duties happened to place him in Pennsylvania that week and who had
taken on most of the Court’s administrative responsibilities when
1789 Act § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74–75.
Joshua Glick, On the Road: The Supreme Court and the History of Circuit
Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1753, 1765 (2003) (“The Southern Circuit required
long trips through rough, unpopulated, and even unknown terrain at times in unpredictably bad nasty weather with lodgings uncertain and often unpleasant.” (citations omitted)).
9
Robert M. Ireland, Iredell, James, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 509 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 2d ed. 2005).
10
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 18–19 (1993).
11
See Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, § 2, 1 Stat. 264, 264.
7
8
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the capital was moved to Philadelphia in 1791. 12 Washington had
appointed Wilson just five years earlier. 13 But, while Wilson was a
trusted Federalist, he didn’t rubber stamp the certification. Instead,
consistent with his duties, Wilson demanded evidence from the administration, which responded by sending Alexander Hamilton—
then Secretary of the Treasury—to secure the testimony of at least
one army colonel who was stationed nearby. 14 It was only after the
colonel testified before the Court that Justice Wilson certified the
rebellion and authorized Washington to call the militia into service.
Justice Wilson’s physical presence in Pennsylvania when the rebellion broke out, in other words, was essential to the speedy administration of justice.
A generation later, in the turbulent early days of the Civil War,
President Lincoln wanted to secure the movement of Union troops
through Maryland—a critical border state—towards the capital. But
Maryland had been teetering on the edge of secession after some
pro-Confederate mobs had attacked a regiment of Union soldiers
and looted some property in Baltimore. So, Lincoln took a drastic
step: He authorized General Winfield Scott to suspend the ancient
writ of habeas corpus. 15 With the writ suspended, federal troops
seized a confederate sympathizer named John Merryman, who (it
was alleged) had participated in the destruction of federal property.
Merryman was detained at Fort McHenry 16—the same Fort
McHenry at which, forty-three years earlier, Francis Scott Key had
composed the lyrics of our Star Spangled Banner. Here, again, the
physical realities on the ground—in this case, the physical limitations the war imposed on the Court—played a critical role in the
leadup to a landmark Supreme Court decision.
Merryman was a wealthy and well-connected southerner whose
lawyers petitioned Chief Justice Taney—then presiding as circuit
12
Maeva Marcus, Wilson as a Justice, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 164
(2019).
13
Todd E. Pettys, Choosing A Chief Justice: Presidential Prerogative or A
Job for the Court?, 22 J.L. & POL. 231, 233 (2006).
14
Richard H. Kohn, The Washington Administration’s Decision to Crush the
Whiskey Rebellion, 59 J. AM. HIST. 567, 572 & n.23 (1972).
15
See Seth Barrett Tillman, Ex Parte Merryman: Myth, History, and Scholarship, 224 MIL. L. REV. 481, 485 (2016).
16
See id. at 487.
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judge—for immediate release. 17 In response, Taney issued a writ of
attachment, by which he ordered General George Cadwalader, the
Union commander at Fort McHenry, to produce Merryman the next
day. But, rather than comply with the Chief Justice’s writ, Cadwalader sent a representative—who arrived without Merryman. Taney
held General Cadwalder in contempt and sent a U.S. Marshal to
seize Merryman. But there was a heavy Union military presence at
Fort McHenry, which prevented the Marshal from reaching his target. Frustrated, Taney decided to write a now-famous opinion—
known to history as Ex parte Merryman—holding Lincoln’s suspension of the writ unconstitutional. 18
Examples like this abound. In 1866, shortly after the end of the
Civil War, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction and death
sentence of Lamden P. Milligan, a “copperhead” 19 who had tried to
subvert the war effort. Milligan had been tried and sentenced to
death—not by a judge or jury, but by a military tribunal. In another
seminal case, Ex parte Milligan, the Court unanimously held that,
“where the courts are open and their process unobstructed,” the Constitution prohibited the federal government from trying civilians in
military tribunals. 20 Towards the end of its opinion, though, the
Court presaged a time when the justice system’s physical limitations
might permit the use of military tribunals. In the event of “foreign
invasion or civil war,” Justice David Davis wrote, the courts may
“actually [be] closed,” rendering it “impossible to administer criminal justice according to law.” 21 In such a case, the Court suggested,
martial law might be permissible.
There’s some dispute about whether Merryman’s lawyers delivered the petition to Justice Taney at his home—in which case they would have served him in
his individual capacity—or whether they petitioned the circuit court, which then
assigned the case to Taney. See id. at 488.
18
See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (1861). In an interesting postscript, Taney ordered the clerk of the Court to transmit a copy of his opinion directly to Lincoln, where it would “remain for that high officer, in fulfilment of his
constitutional obligation to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed,’ to determine what measures he will take to cause the civil process of the United States
to be respected and enforced.” Id. at 153. Merryman ultimately named one of his
sons after Taney.
19
A northern Democrat who favored settlement with the Confederacy.
20
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866).
21
See id. at 127.
17
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Of course, until the COVID-19 pandemic, Milligan’s warning
about a hypothetical day in which courts might have to shut down
always seemed unlikely. In March 2020, though, all of that changed.
On March 11, 2020, with infections skyrocketing, the World Health
Organization declared the COVID-19 outbreak a global pandemic. 22
Two days later, the President of the United States declared a national
emergency. That same day, K. Michael Moore, then-Chief Judge of
our Court, entered the first in a series of administrative orders that
continued jury trials in the Southern District of Florida “in order to
protect the public health[ ] and . . . to reduce the size of public gatherings and reduce necessary travel.” 23 About two weeks later, Chief
Judge Moore suspended all grand jury sessions in the Southern District of Florida 24—a moratorium he ultimately extended until November 17, 2020. 25 For the first time in 230 years, courts around the
country were experiencing the kinds of closures Justice Davis had
only mused about in Milligan.
Over the last two years, the federal government has taken several
other actions to slow the spread of COVID-19 and to mitigate its
worst effects. Those executive decisions have led to dozens of lawsuits—most of which have cast the courts in their now-familiar role
of impartial arbiters over the propriety of governmental action. In
December 2021, for example, a divided panel of the Eleventh Circuit refused to stay pending appeal a rule promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services, which required healthcare
workers to be vaccinated against COVID-19. 26 And the Eleventh
Circuit is now considering the viability of a district court’s

See Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15337 (Mar. 18, 2020) (noting
the WHO’s declaration).
23
Our Court’s administrative orders relating to the COVID-19 pandemic can
be found at https://www.flsd.uscourts.gov/administrative-orders-relating-covid19.
24
See Order Concerning Grand Jury Sessions, Administrative Order 2020-22
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2020).
25
See In re: Partial Sequestration of Grand Jurors, Administrative Order
2020-87 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2020) (resuming grand jury proceedings on November 17, 2020).
26
Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 19 F.4th 1271 (11th Cir. 2021).
22
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nationwide injunction that had the practical effect of staying the implementation of a vaccination mandate for government contractors. 27
But court closures and pandemic safety measures have raised a
host of other, unique legal issues that (again) raise questions about
the extent to which the courts’ physical operations affect litigative
outcomes. One of the most interesting of these involves the juxtaposition between the five-year statute of limitations that governs most
federal crimes (on the one hand) 28 and our Court’s suspension of
grand-jury proceedings (on the other). The problem these cases present is this: While our grand-jury moratorium was still in effect, the
Government faced a Hobson’s choice when it came to defendants
who had committed their crimes almost five years earlier. It could
either allow the five-year statute of limitations to expire (which
would mean absolving these defendants of their crimes) or it could
commence a criminal prosecution before the window closed by instituting29 an information—with the understanding that, as soon as
the grand jurors returned, it would dismiss the information and get
its indictment. Unsurprisingly, the Government chose the latter
course: It charged these defendants by information and, once the
grand jury reconvened, indicted them. But (and here’s the rub) some
of these defendants never waived their right to have their cases presented to a grand jury—a right enshrined in both the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 30 and Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 31 This wouldn’t be such a big deal—except
that, while these informations were pending (and before our Court
Georgia v. President of the U.S., No. 1:21-cv-163, 2021 WL 5779939 (S.D.
Ga. Dec. 7, 2021), appeal filed, No. 21-14269 (11th Cir. Dec. 10, 2021).
28
18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).
29
That’s the word Congress chose in the Crimes Act of 1790. See ch. 9, § 32,
1 Stat. 112, 119 (“[N]or shall any person be prosecuted, tried or punished for any
offence, not capital, nor any fine or forfeiture under any penal statute, unless the
indictment or information for the same shall be found or instituted within two
years from the time of committing the offence.” (emphasis added)).
30
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury[.]”).
31
Rule 7 allows defendants to waive prosecution by indictment—but only if
they do so “in open court” and only after they’ve been “advised of the nature of
the charge and of [their] rights.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 7.
27
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brought the grand jurors back), the five-year statutes of limitations
on many of these crimes expired. Contending that the Government
worked a clever—if illegal—end-run around their rights, some of
these defendants moved to dismiss their indictments. And their motions have split our courts: Judge Ruiz and I came out one way, and
Judge Middlebrooks went the other. 32 The question is now pending
before the Eleventh Circuit, which heard arguments on Judge Middlebrooks’s case late last year. 33
The pandemic has presented other practical questions, too: Will
we see, as we have in some state courts, federal criminal trials by
Zoom? 34 Would a Zoom cross-examination satisfy the Confrontation Clause if it’s conducted over the defendant’s objection? Would
vaccine requirements for venire members impinge on the litigants’
right to select jurors from a representative sample of the community? And would a judge’s decision to close his courtroom to unvaccinated spectators violate a defendant’s, or the community’s, rights
to a public trial? As courts continue to struggle with the after-effects
of the pandemic, these questions, and others like them, will need to
be resolved.
Fortunately, as of this writing, death rates have plummeted, and
the Center for Disease Control has begun to relax most of its safety
recommendations. Schools are ending mask mandates, and workers
are returning to their offices in large numbers. Here at the Wilkie D.
Ferguson Courthouse in downtown Miami, familiar sounds are once
again echoing through the halls: of lawyers conversing in the rotunda; of jurors shuffling into courtrooms; of FBI agents pushing
boxes of evidence in for trial. Even as our courthouses return to full
strength, however, the harrowing events of the last two years should
remind us of the institutional challenges courts might face in future
exigencies. In preparing for these inevitable crises—from disease,
environmental catastrophes, or cyberattacks—we ought to think
32
United States v. Sanfilippo, 2021 WL 5414945 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (Altman,
J.); United States v. Rosecan, 528 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1292–93 (S.D. Fla. 2021)
(Ruiz, J.); United States v. B.G.G., No. 20-cr-80063-DMM (S.D. Fla. Jan. 1,
2021) (Middlebrooks, J.), ECF No. 19.
33
See United States v. B.G.G., No. 21-10165 (11th Cir. appeal filed Jan. 14,
2021).
34
See, e.g., Trial by Zoom: Virtual Trials in the Time of COVID-19, JD
SUPRA (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/trial-by-zoom-virtual-trials-in-the-8191722/.
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more deeply, not only (as we often do) about the interrelationship
between executive action and civil liberties, but also about how a
court functions during an emergency and about the extent to which
the mechanics of judicial operations can influence litigation outcomes.
***
In this Eleventh Circuit Issue, the University of Miami Law Review has collected a series of thought-provoking articles, two of
which address some of the pandemic problems we’ve been highlighting here. In Hiding in Plain Language: A Solution to the Pandemic Riddle of a Suspended Grand Jury, an Expiring Statute of
Limitations, and the Fifth Amendment, Nicole Mariani—who argued the B.G.G. case in the Eleventh Circuit—examines the text of
the Crimes Act of 1790, the case law interpreting it, and the statute’s
structure and purpose and concludes that, through a savings clause
in 18 U.S.C. § 3288, Congress expressly authorized the government
to prosecute certain criminal defendants whose statutes of limitations expired during the pandemic. In Florida’s Judicial Ethics
Rules: History, Text, and Use, Professor Robert M. Jarvis offers a
useful guide on the codes of conduct that govern Florida’s state and
federal judges. And, in Maritime Magic: How Cruise Lines Can
Avoid State Law Compliance Through Passenger Contracts, Cameron Chuback addresses the merits of a Florida statute—struck
down by a member of our Court—that sought to prohibit cruise lines
from requiring passengers to show proof of vaccination. 35 I hope
you’ll enjoy these pieces as much as I have.

35
Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd. v. Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d 1143
(S.D. Fla. 2021) (Williams, J.).

